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Abstract
Uganda’s mobile money sector has grown rapidly since its introduction in 2009. As at 
the last quarter of 2015, there were 21.1 million registered mobile money users in the 
country, representing a penetration of about 54%. As well as providing a convenient, 
cheap and safe means of money transfer, mobile money has spurred increased 
financial inclusion, which grew from 28% in 2009 to 54% in 2013. The rapid growth 
has happened under conditions of “light touch” regulation of the sector, which 
allows the first mover to reap the rewards of investments made, but raises potential 
competition issues. The mobile money sector, much like the telecommunications 
sector, is characterised by network externalities, lock-in effects and high barriers to 
entry that can give rise to a concentrated sector with a single dominant player. This 
article considers the effect of light touch regulation on the competitive dynamics 
in the mobile money market in Uganda and contrasts this with the experience in 
Tanzania, where regulation evolved from a light touch style to a more comprehensive 
framework as the sector grew.  
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1. Background and introduction
Mobile money has been a fast-growing phenomenon in the East Africa region and 
Uganda is no exception. The number of registered mobile money subscribers in 
Uganda grew from about 600,000 in 2009, when mobile money was introduced, 
to over 21 million at the end of 2015, and the numbers and value of mobile money 
transactions also showed strong growth (Figure 1). This success has been partly 
attributed to the relatively light touch regulation governing the mobile money sector 
in Uganda, one of the four factors in the success of mobile money identified by Evans 
and Pirchio (2015) for take-off and explosive growth, along with poor infrastructure, 
the simultaneous growth of mobile money users and agents, and acceptance. These 
features are common to the eight countries (including Uganda) where mobile money 
has succeeded, out of the 22 countries studied by those authors. In this context, 
light touch regulation refers to minimal limitations on who can operate a mobile 
money scheme and allows for mobile network operator (MNO)-led mobile money, 
rather than bank-led schemes which have generally not succeeded. The regulatory 
provisions include light know your customer (KYC) requirements and minimal 
restrictions on who can act as an agent (Bourreau & Valletti, 2015).
Figure 1: Growth in mobile money customers, and in number and value of transactions
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Source: BoU (2015); UCC (2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016)
One of the consequences of this rapid growth may be the emergence of a dominant 
firm, as there are strong first mover advantages, high barriers to entry and network 
externalities in mobile money markets, as there are in telecommunications. Indeed, 
in the “MNO-led model”, one of the mobile telecommunications companies will 
likely gain this position in mobile money services. Light touch regulation may allow 
high rewards for the investment the company makes in building a platform for 
users, where it is unconstrained in earning returns and can bolster its position in 
mobile telecommunications. Its rivals may be unable to catch up in the absence of 
interoperability between mobile money platforms. 
Competition theory has shown that lack of competition may lead to high prices and 
reduced incentive to innovate (Banda, Robb, Roberts & Vilakazi, 2015). Dominant 
players may also have the incentive to abuse their dominance by taking part in anti-
competitive conduct, such as margin squeeze, in order to foreclose possible entrants 
in downstream markets and guard abnormal profit (Mazer & Rowan, 2016). In such 
instances, existing regulation needs to be able to address any possible anti-competitive 
behaviour and encourage competition.
Uganda’s mobile money sector development provides the basis for a case study 
in which to assess the challenges of regulation, as the extension of mobile money 
is characterised by the presence of a strong market leader and limited regulation. 
This article explains the structure and regulatory framework of mobile money in 
Uganda; then assesses the interaction of regulation and competition, identifying key 
competition bottlenecks, which could be addressed by regulation; before analysing 
them in the specific case of Uganda. The article concludes by considering what 
regulatory approaches might lead to more competitive outcomes in the sector.
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Mobile money market structure
Mobile money was introduced by MTN Uganda, in March 2009, as a customer 
retention strategy, following intensifying competition from a new entrant, Warid 
Telecom, which used aggressive on- and off-net discounting to build a customer 
base (sector participant, personal interview, 19 January 2016). Currently, four mobile 
network operators (MNOs) are providing mobile money solutions: MTN Uganda 
through MTN Mobile Money, Airtel Uganda through Airtel Money, Africell 
Uganda/Orange Uganda through Africell Uganda Money, and Uganda Telecom 
through M-Sente. A number of non-MNO mobile payments providers, such as 
MCash, EzeeMoney, and Smart Money, have also entered the mobile money space 
(BoU, 2015). 
Airtel Uganda was the second MNO to introduce mobile money in June 2009, a few 
months after MTN Uganda. M-Sente was launched in March 2010. Warid Pesa
began operations in December 2011 and Orange Money2 was launched in the first 
half of 2012 (Ggombe, 2014). Airtel Uganda later merged with Warid Telecom in 
2013. In terms of mobile money subscriber numbers, MTN Uganda has maintained 
the largest share of 58.4% in 2015, followed by Airtel Money with 27.2% (Table 
1). However, MTN Uganda’s leading position is likely to be much stronger if one 
considers the amount and volume of transactions, with figures showing MTN 
Uganda as having a share in terms of usage of 72% (Figure 2). This is because as 
many as 40% of subscribers have two or more SIM cards, but mainly use one of 
them (FII, 2014). Customers often subscribe to services they will not use, if that 
subscription is free, particularly for new technologies. The market shares in Table 1 
thus underestimate MTN Uganda’s market share and dominance. 
Table 1: Statistics for mobile operators with mobile money services in March 2015
Mobile network/
mobile money service
Mobile subscrib-
ers (millions)
Mobile money subscribers 
(millions)
Market share 
%
MTN Uganda/MTN Mobile 
Money
10.4 7.3 58.4
Airtel Uganda (Warid)/Airtel 
Money
7.5 3.4 27.2
Uganda Telecom/M-Sente 9.8 1.3 10.4
Africell Uganda (Orange) Uganda/
Africell Uganda Money
0.6 0.5 4
Total 20.5 12.5 100
Source: Okwii (2015a)
2  Orange Money was acquired by Africell Uganda and is now known as Africell Uganda Money.
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Figure 2: Utilisation of mobile money services by service provider in 2013 (%)
Source: EPRC (2013)
Note: This is based on a survey which asked respondents about their usage.
In order to provide mobile money services, providers are required to partner with a 
commercial bank3 (UCC, personal interview, 19 January 2016). The banks hold an 
escrow account on behalf of the MNO, mirroring the mobile money deposits held. 
MTN Uganda initially partnered with Stanbic bank; Airtel Uganda with Citibank 
and Standard Chartered; Orange Uganda with Standard Chartered; and Uganda 
Telecom with DFCU and PostBank (Okwii, 2014). Today, individual MNOs partner 
with several banks to effect mobile banking and payments. MTN Uganda, for 
example, is partnered with eleven financial institutions (MTN Uganda, 2015). The 
banks have not themselves been active mobile money providers in Uganda. This may 
change with the introduction of agent banking, which became lawful in early 2016 
(Muhumuza, 2016).
Aggregators also play an important role in the mobile money sector. When mobile 
money services were first introduced, the providers realised that platforms with 
particular functionality and capacity were required to run the services efficiently 
(McGrath & Lonie, 2013). The basic platforms used for GSM services did not have 
sufficient capacity or the ability to manage additional mobile money requirements. 
Functionalities required by mobile money platforms include customer activities such 
as cash-in and cash-out, purchase of airtime, transfer of money, bulk payments, bulk 
transfers and bill payment; agent activities, and business reports and MNO activities 
(McGrath & Lonie, 2013). In Uganda, as in many countries, aggregator companies 
play this role by developing, running and maintaining the necessary platforms to 
run these mobile money services. These companies develop innovative products 
and platforms to ease e-commerce and mobile money payments or transfers. Some
3  As discussed in more detail in the section on the regulatory landscape below, the mobile money 
sector is currently regulated via a set of Mobile Money Guidelines published by the Central Bank of 
Uganda. 
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of these include Yo! Uganda Ltd, Beyonic, EzeeMoney, Remit, Payway and Jpesa 
(Okwii, 2015b). 
History and evolution of service offering
Uganda’s mobile money market remains primarily a person-to-person transfer and 
payments market. The range of services has, however, expanded to include the remote 
purchase of airtime, bill payments for utilities, solar power products, school fees, 
university fees, taxes, parking, insurance premiums, national lottery, pay-TV services 
payments, bulk payment of salaries, international remittances, and savings. 
The development of mobile payments services has followed the pattern of mobile 
money. By 2015, the majority of utility payments were carried out using MTN 
Uganda mobile money services, which facilitate an average of 71.4% of all utility 
payments monthly (MTN Uganda, 2015). The mobile money providers have now 
also partnered with banks to enable withdrawals at ATMs. However, person-to-
person transfers are still by far the most important service, accounting for 90% of 
MTN Uganda’s mobile money revenue in 2015 (MTN Uganda, personal interview, 
21 January 2016). 
Mobile savings and loans were launched in late 2016, some four years after Kenya and 
two years after Tanzania. In August 2016,  MTN Uganda launched micro-savings 
and microloan services, MoKash, in partnership with Commercial Bank of Africa 
(CBA) (Ochwo, 2016). The product allows MTN Uganda mobile money customers 
to start a savings account from as little as UGX50 (approximately USD0.01) and earn 
interest of between 2% and 5%, depending on the amount saved (Ochwo, 2016). The 
interest on the saving is accrued and paid quarterly and the customer can schedule 
to deposit into the savings account automatically on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis 
(Dignited, 2016). Airtel Uganda and Uganda Telecom have also been working on 
developing savings and loan products.
The MoKash platform allows customers to apply for short-term loans of between 
UGX3000 and UGX1 million (approximately USD1 and USD300), depending on 
the customer’s credit limit, which is determined with reference to a customer’s usage 
of other MTN Uganda services (voice, data and mobile money). Customers do not 
need to open a bank account to access the MoKash service but can simply register for 
the services over the mobile money platform. Activation and transactions between 
MoKash and MTN Mobile Money are free for both savings and loans, but loans 
attract an interest rate of 9% for a period of 30 days. Thereafter, a penalty of a further 
9% may be lodged against a defaulter (Dignited, 2016).
Uganda does not permit outgoing cross-border mobile remittances, largely due to 
regulatory barriers relating to foreign exchange controls. Mobile remittance products 
for the East African Community have been developed in Uganda and applications 
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have been submitted to the Bank of Uganda (BoU) for approval. However, due to 
lack of explicit regulation to provide for compliance and enforcement measures for 
mobile money products generally and a lack of capacity and procedures to evaluate 
product innovations, the products were not yet available at the time of this study 
(BoU, 2015). The BoU submitted a proposed amendment to the Foreign Exchange 
Act of 2004 to address these gaps. In the interim, the BoU was evaluating applications 
to launch new products on a case by case basis (BoU, 2015). Following the signing of 
a memorandum between MTN Uganda and Safaricom in December 2015, inward 
mobile money transfers (MMT) could be made from Kenya through Safaricom to 
an MTN account in Uganda (Chao-Blasto, 2015).
With the continued integration of the East African community, the introduction of 
“one area” roaming and products that allow for cross-border transactions are increasing 
in importance. Tanzania, Rwanda and Kenya have launched cross-border remittance 
services. In Tanzania, Tigo provides for international transfers between Tigo Pesa 
accounts in Tanzania and Tigo Cash accounts in Rwanda (Roberts, Blechman & 
Odhiambo, 2016).  Similarly, in March 2015, Vodacom launched international 
transfers between M-Pesa accounts in Tanzania and M-Pesa accounts offered by 
Safaricom in Kenya.  In August 2015, Tigo partnered with WorldRemit to allow its 
subscribers to send and receive remittances internationally. 
Regulatory framework
The mobile money industry in Uganda is overseen by two regulatory authorities, the 
BoU and the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC). Only one regulation 
specifically targets the mobile money sector in Uganda, namely the Mobile Money 
Guidelines issued by the BoU in 2013. Its legal status is ambiguous, although it 
is generally treated as if it is binding. A National Payments System Act has been 
drafted, which would govern mobile financial services, amongst other matters, but 
it is yet to go through parliamentary approval processes (BoU, personal interview, 
20 January 2016). The BoU has authorised mobile money services by issuing “no-
objection” letters to the commercial banks, who partner with the MNOs, and requires 
the bank to hold the balances recorded in the mobile wallet in an escrow account. 
Mobile banking services (with savings and loans) require separate approval. The 
individual mobile money subscriber now, in effect, opens a bank account with the 
partner bank. Effectively, the BoU regulates the MNO indirectly through the partner 
bank, having the ultimate power to withdraw the bank’s license in cases of irregular 
conduct by the mobile money provider. This indirect mechanism of regulating mobile 
money services applies in the absence of a more comprehensive regulatory framework 
that might license the mobile money provider directly. It arose as technology evolved 
more quickly than the regulatory regime, which then had to play catch-up. The 
mobile money guidelines were effectively introduced as an interim measure to govern 
the industry. 
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Mobile money services are usually provided by MNOs, which puts some aspects 
of their activities and services under the purview of UCC, although the UCC has 
not played an active regulatory role in relation to mobile money services. The UCC 
is mandated by the Communications Act, No. 1 of 2013 to undertake a number 
of functions in relation to licensing, tariff regulation, competition, spectrum 
management and economic regulation. There is no competition regulation regime 
in Uganda. However, the Communications Act gives the UCC authority to regulate 
an extensive range of competition issues in the telecommunication sector. One of the 
UCC’s functions is “to promote competition, including the protection of operators 
from acts and practices of other operators that are damaging to competition, and to 
facilitate the entry into markets of new and modern systems and services” (Parliament 
of Uganda, sect. 5(1)(n)). Section 53(1) of the Communications Act prohibits 
“activities, which have, or are intended or are likely to have, the effect of unfairly 
preventing, restricting or distorting competition in relation to any business activity 
relating to communications services” and section 53(2) prohibits abuse of a dominant 
position, including abuse “which unfairly excludes or limits competition between the 
operator and any other party.” An abuse of dominance also includes “entering into an 
agreement or engaging in any concerted practice with any other party, which unfairly 
prevents, restricts or distorts competition”, as well as anti-competitive mergers and 
acquisitions (sect. 53(2)(b) and (c)). The UCC has the power to investigate breaches 
of fair competition and may issue stop orders, impose fines up to 10% of an operator’s 
annual turnover, and declare anticompetitive agreements or contracts null and void. 
These are strong enforcement powers by any measure, although they have not been 
used in relation to mobile money services.
The mobile money guidelines also address competition issues, prohibiting exclusivity 
between banks and MNOs, and between MNOs and their agents. The latter has 
been the subject of a competition investigation by the Competition Authority of 
Kenya in that country (Ochieng’, 2014).
2. The interplay of regulation and competition in mobile money 
Mobile money technology has grown faster than regulation, and policy makers have 
had to consider a number of regulatory issues, such as which entities are allowed 
to provide these services, the security of the technology, the possible effect on the 
stability of the financial system, fraud, competition, provision of access to essential 
telecommunications infrastructure and promotion of competition, among other 
things (Macmillan, 2016). Additionally, regulators have had to consider which 
mobile money issues fall under the financial regulator and which fall under the 
telecommunications regulator. The general consensus appears to be that there 
is a need for coordination between the two sector regulators, as well as with the 
competition and consumer protection regulators, to ensure that the majority of the 
issues identified above are addressed (Macmillan, 2016).
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In simple terms, two regulatory models of mobile money predominate: the bank led 
model, or the MNO-led model (Hernandez, Bernstein & Zirkle, 2011; Suárez, 2016). 
The track record suggests that the MNO-led model has been more conducive to the 
growth of mobile money (Evans & Pirchio, 2015). While the bank-led model has 
controls to mitigate risks and ensure data security, banks are often slow to innovate 
and respond to the needs of the market (Hernandez et al., 2011). Regulations under 
the bank-led model tend to be much stricter and have inhibited mobile money 
growth.
The MNO-led model has often been more accessible to the poor, due to distribution 
capabilities of MNOs compared to banks, and less restrictive in terms of regulation. 
One concern about the model has been the susceptibility to customer or agent fraud, 
and competition issues that arise where MNOs control the means of delivery of 
services by their competitors. It is this model, however, that has been largely present 
in countries that have experienced successful growth of the mobile money sector 
(Evans & Pirchio, 2015). 
While the often light touch regulation that characterises the MNO-led model has 
facilitated growth of the sector, it raises questions about regulation on competition 
grounds, given the implications of network effects, barriers to entry and economies of 
scale. The mobile money sector requires significant levels of capital investment, due 
to the amount of infrastructure required and is thus characterised by high sunk costs. 
These costs create high barriers to entry and result in first mover advantages for the 
first mobile money provider to venture into the sector. 
Mobile money is subject to network effects, those which are inherent in the 
telecommunication sector, and those of mobile money services themselves (Bourreau 
& Valletti, 2015). Network effects exist where the utility derived from consuming 
a product increases, as more users consume that product. In telecommunications, 
for example, the more people that are connected to the network, the more useful it 
becomes, because more people can communicate with each other (Rohlfs, 1974). In 
mobile money, the value of a mobile money platform increases, as more people accept 
and use the platform, because more people can make more transfers and payments 
to a larger number of recipients. There is a positive externality as a user is added to a 
network, as this generates a benefit to all the existing users (Katz & Shapiro, 1985).
Where networks interoperate seamlessly, without significant additional cost, the 
combined network effect is shared among the interoperating networks. But where 
there is no interoperability, or where it is costly to send traffic to or transact across 
the other network (a substantial difference between on-net and off-net charges), the 
larger network will have a competitive advantage simply by virtue of its size and can 
effectively lock-in customers (Farrell & Klemperer, 2007). 
Related to network effects is the phenomenon of two-sided markets. Two-sided 
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markets occur when two different sets of users interact through the same platform 
and for which the decisions of one user group affects the outcomes faced by the 
other group (Rysman, 2009). The different user groups derive benefits from being 
connected using the same platform, as is the case in the mobile money sector 
(Armstrong, 2006). The mobile money sector is a clear example of a two-sided 
market, where both agents and subscribers derive benefit from interaction on the 
same platform. The increase in the number of agents on one side of the market 
results in the increase of subscribers on the other side of the market. A platform is 
only successful if it attracts both agents and subscribers simultaneously (Evans & 
Pirchio, 2015). The platform must grow in such a way as to attract new clients, but 
maintain the interest of early adopters. Once this growth reaches critical mass, with 
both agents and subscribers growing simultaneously, the value of the existing users is 
sufficient to attract new users (Evans & Pirchio, 2015).
 
Due to network externalities, the incumbent network is more likely to attract 
consumers, agents and merchants with regards to mobile payments. The incumbent 
network represents greater opportunity for them for higher volumes of transactions. 
In addition, to the extent that the sector is also subject to economies of scale, the 
incumbent network may be able to provide the service at a lower cost than new 
entrants. The high barriers to entry and network externalities identified above can 
lead to a concentrated sector, as is the case in Uganda (Table 1 and Figure 2). 
The structure of the mobile money sector discussed above may result in competition 
bottlenecks in certain levels of the value chain. Four main areas of concern can be 
identified (Sitbon, 2015):
• Connectivity: Until greater penetration of smart phones is achieved, there are 
two main ways in which mobile money services can be provided: through un-
structured supplementary service data (USSD) or through short message service 
(SMS) (Bourreau & Valletti, 2015). These are the means by which a user may 
send or receive messages concerning money transfer. The infrastructure by which 
these methods are used is owned by an MNO. Therefore, in order for a non-
MNO mobile money provider to provide these services, they require the cooper-
ation of the network provider, which they may not be willing to provide, or may 
provide at high prices or at poor quality (Mazer & Rowan, 2016).
• Agent network: As mentioned earlier, due to the two-sided nature of the sec-
tor, agents who facilitate cash in and cash out transactions are essential for the 
success of the mobile money scheme. Incumbent networks that have invested 
significantly in the development of agent networks may sign exclusive contracts 
with such agents, or impose exclusivity through tacit understanding, thus re-
stricting access of entrants to potential customers. Given the significant cost 
involved in setting up an agent network, it is often not feasible to set up another 
agent network alongside the existing one.
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• Account interoperability: Mobile money providers may not interoperate with oth-
er providers, or if they do, they may set lower prices for transfers within the same 
network (on-net) than transfers across different networks (off-net). The network 
externalities support the incumbent player and make it difficult for entrants to 
attract users. 
• Applications: The mobile money platform has the ability to support a number of 
value-added services.  However, mobile money providers may foreclose providers 
of some of these services and applications, by refusing access to application pro-
gramming interfaces (APIs) that are necessary to integrate such services with the 
mobile money platform. MNOs’ systems may be non-interoperable, or non-user 
friendly, except for pre-approved applications by a few chosen firms.
As the sector grows and matures, effective competition is necessary to reduce prices, 
improve the quality of products and services, as well as increase the diversity of 
the product offering (Mazer & Rowan, 2016). It is well recognised that regulatory 
intervention may be necessary to ensure more competitive outcomes in markets 
with network effects and economies of scale (Viscusi, Vernon & Harrington, 2005). 
Such interventions can be classified into two categories, ex ante regulation or ex post 
regulation. Ex ante regulation refers to regulation established in expectation of a 
possible market failure or abuse of dominance, while ex post regulation is enacted 
after the fact and following an investigation and confirmation of anticompetitive 
behaviour by firms. While ex ante regulation can protect competitive rivalry at the 
outset, such as by mandating interoperability, it can also reduce incentives to invest in 
a network, as other smaller rivals can “free ride” to an extent on the investment being 
made by the first mover (Bourreau & Valletti, 2015). 
In the initial stages of a new service, conditions need to allow an incentive to invest, 
as otherwise the service does not take-off. The question is what regulation should 
be introduced at the beginning, and at what point greater regulation (including 
competition enforcement) is required to prevent abuse of the market power, which 
may be gained by the lead firm as it gains incumbent advantages. It is in balancing 
the incentives of the lead firm and its rivals, and the interests of firms and consumers, 
that the regulatory challenges lie (Viscusi et al., 2005).
3. Competition issues in the Ugandan mobile money market 
The case study of the evolution of mobile money in Uganda raises a number of issues 
which we assess here, before analysing the implications for competition enforcement 
and regulation in more detail in the subsequent section. The competition issues 
which have emerged in Uganda are largely in line with the four issues identified 
by Sitbon (2015), as described above. In addition, potential for coordinated pricing 
appears to be an issue. 
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Interoperability and high off-net charges
As of 2016, there is no interoperability between mobile wallets in Uganda, which 
makes smaller rival networks significantly less attractive than MTN Uganda. The 
“unregistered”/off-net person receiving the transfer must make a physical withdrawal 
at the sending mobile money provider’s agent. The inconvenience of this generates a 
barrier to using mobile money providers other than those that have a large number of 
active subscribers, principally MTN Uganda. This is reflected in the large differences 
observed between subscriber numbers and usage, reflected in Table 1 and Figure 2 
above.
Network effects are reinforced by the absence of mobile number portability in 
Uganda, which imposes switching costs on consumers and locks them into a 
particular telecommunications network for telecommunications services, and thus 
also (in the MNO-led model) mobile money services. The utility of a personal phone 
number may become even more valuable as mobile financial services evolve to include 
loans and savings, as has occurred from 2016. Accessing loans depends on a credit 
rating, based on calculations that take into account transaction data from customers’ 
airtime top-ups and mobile money cash-in deposits, transfers, payments and cash-
out withdrawals. The benefit of remaining on one network increases significantly, as 
eligibility for credit becomes inextricably linked to one’s phone number.
The network effects in the absence of interoperability are reflected in pricing by 
MTN Uganda and Airtel Uganda. Both MTN Uganda and Airtel Uganda’s prices 
for transfers to unregistered users are far higher than the equivalent they charge 
to transfer to registered users (Figure 3). For the tier UGX30,001-45,000, within 
which a large number of transfers fall (equivalent to around USD10), both MTN 
Uganda and Airtel Uganda customers must pay UGX2,800 (or around 6.2% of the 
upper limit of the transfer value of UGX45,000) to transfer to an unregistered user, 
compared with UGX1,100 (or around 2.4% of the upper limit of the transfer value 
of UGX45,000) to a registered user. 
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Figure 3: On-net and off-net prices for mobile money transfers, 
MTN Uganda and Airtel Uganda (as % of transaction value at upper limit of tiers)
Source: MTN Uganda (n.d.)
Uganda’s charges for transfers to off-net or unregistered users are significantly higher 
than in Kenya and Tanzania (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Comparison of off-net mobile money transfer charges in 2015
for Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, USD (largest operators in each country)
Source: MTN Uganda, Vodacom Tanzania and Safaricom Kenya websites, 2015 
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Access to telecommunications network services
For other organisations, such as banks, to provide mobile money services to 
their existing customers, they need to be able to provide access over mobile 
telecommunications networks. For those customers who have smart phones, this 
can be done via an app such as for Internet banking. However, whereas in Uganda 
smartphone penetration is very low, the main way in which access can be provided 
is via USSD. This means that the MNOs can undermine other actual or potential 
rivals, via their control over USSD access. 
MNOs may engage in a constructive refusal to provide access by, for example, putting 
in place a strict and lengthy application process for such access by non-MNOs. In 
at least one case, MTN was fined UGX2.3 billion (USD662,000) by a Commercial 
Court for anti-competitive conduct against a downstream rival, EzeeMoney 
(EzeeMoney (U) Limited v. MTN Uganda Limited, 2015). When EzeeMoney entered 
the mobile payments market, it contracted MTN Uganda for the provision of digital 
transmission, as well as 30 fixed telephone lines. EzeeMoney also contracted Yo! 
to provide aggregation services. According to the Court’s findings, MTN Uganda 
subsequently cancelled its contract with EzeeMoney, citing the fact that EzeeMoney 
was a direct competitor to its own mobile money business. MTN Uganda then 
coerced Yo! to cancel its contract with EzeeMoney, or risk access to MTN Uganda’s 
services. The Court also found that MTN Uganda compelled its agents to deny 
EzeeMoney services and cut off EzeeMoney’s GSM point of sale (PoS) device. 
The effect of MTN Uganda’s refusal to provide both USSD services and access to 
phone lines to EzeeMoney was found to be a 79% drop in the number of transactions 
by EzeeMoney. EzeeMoney also needed about nine months to restore its systems, 
following MTN Uganda’s breach of contract. The terminals that had been configured 
to use MTN Uganda SIM cards had to be reconfigured at significant expense to 
EzeeMoney. MTN Uganda’s actions appear to have succeeded in foreclosing 
EzeeMoney out of the mobile money business, forcing the company to develop a 
new mode of operation. 
Agent exclusivity 
There were no prohibitions on agent exclusivity when mobile money was launched 
in Uganda. Though it is not clear whether this was an explicit regulatory decision, 
or simply the result of a lack of regulation, it meant in practice that MTN Uganda 
could roll out an extensive agent network that exclusively provided MTN Uganda 
mobile money services. The exclusivity was obviously beneficial to MTN Uganda 
and improved the business case for investing in recruiting and training mobile money 
agents. 
Agent exclusivity was removed in 2013 with the release of the BoU’s mobile money 
guidelines. It took several months for exclusivity to be removed in practice and 
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for agents to feel safe providing services for rival mobile money providers (sector 
participant, personal interview, 19 January 2016). In the case brought by EzeeMoney 
against MTN Uganda (referenced above), one of EzeeMoney’s complaints was 
that MTN Uganda staff physically attacked agents with EzeeMoney branding 
(EzeeMoney (U) Limited v. MTN Uganda Limited, 2015). While agent exclusivity has 
now been prohibited in Uganda, agents may still choose to work only with a single 
provider, as is the case with MTN Uganda’s master agents. MTN Uganda’s larger 
network makes this a profitable option. 
Coordinated conduct
While MTN Uganda is the largest mobile money provider by a substantial margin, 
the second placed Airtel Uganda is significant, especially in terms of subscribers. The 
retail prices for on-net and off-net prices of these two players are notably very similar 
(Table 2 and Table 3), unlike those of the smaller players UTL and Africell Uganda. 
Similar prices may result from vigorous competition, but may also reflect some form 
of coordination or mutual understanding. Prices for the smaller players UTL and 
Africell Uganda are different and appear to be competitive. Africell Uganda does not, 
in fact, charge any fees for transfers to registered users. 
Table 2: Mobile money tariffs per tier for sending money to registered users per service 
provider in Uganda shillings (UGX)4
Tiers MTN Uganda Airtel Uganda UTL Africell Uganda
500 – 2,500 500 500 450 0
2,501 -  5,000 500 500 1,000 0
5,001 – 15,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0
15,001 -  30,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0
30,001 – 45,000 1,100 1,100 1,000 0
45,001 – 60,000 1,100 1,100 1,000 0
60,001 – 125,000 1,400 1,400 1,000 0
125,001 – 250,000 1,400 1,400 1,000 0
250,001 – 500,000 1,400 1,400 1,000 0
500,001 – 1,000,000 2,200 2,200 2,300 0
100,0001 – 2,000,000 2,200 2,200 2,300 0
2,000,001 – 4,000,000 2,200 2,200 2,300 Not provided
Source: Operator websites
4  Tariffs are as at 17 February 2016 and were obtained from the MTN Uganda, Airtel Uganda, UTL 
and Africell Uganda websites.
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Table 3: Mobile money tariffs per tier for sending money to unregistered users per service 
provider in Uganda shillings (UGX)5
Tiers MTN Uganda Airtel Uganda UTL Africell Uganda
500 – 2,500 1,000 1,000 450 880
2,501 -  5,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 880
5,001 – 15,000 2,000 2,000 1,000 1,900
15,001 -  30,000 2,200 2,200 1,000 1,900
30,001 – 45,000 2,800 2,800 1,000 2,800
45,001 – 60,000 2,800 2,800 1,000 2,800
60,001 – 125,000 4,400 4,400 1,000 4,200
125,001 – 250,000 8,400 8,400 1,000 7,700
250,001 – 500,000 11,000 11,000 1,000 11,000
500,001 – 1,000,000 21,000 21,000 2,300 21,000
100,0001 – 2,000,000 40,000 40,000 2,300 38,000
2,000,001 – 4,000,000 70,500 70,500 2,300 Not provided
Source: Operator websites
4. Evolution of regulation and the impact on competition 
Mobile money in Uganda initially evolved in a regulatory grey area, with no clear 
rules and no single regulator. The regulatory framework had to play catch-up to 
rapid developments in the sector, as is common in new and disruptive sectors, such 
as mobile money. The interesting questions are, what effect this had on the structure 
of the market and, in turn, on current and future competition and the implications 
for regulation. 
The growth of mobile money benefited from initial regulatory light touch, particularly 
in areas such as agent exclusivity (Sitbon, 2015). The ability to roll out an exclusive 
agent network strengthened MTN Uganda’s business case for launching the service 
and making the investments required, including conducting public awareness and 
education campaigns to encourage consumers to try the service. Though competitors 
who followed benefited from MTN Uganda’s investment in public awareness and 
education, which encouraged adoption of the service, they still had to invest in 
replicating an agent network. Until 2013, they could not approach the most attractive 
agents, such as the established retailers in a given area, who had largely already signed 
up with MTN Uganda. Airtel Uganda seems to be the only competitor who had the 
resources to roll out a competing network on any significant scale. As shown in the 
discussion above, these two firms remain the largest networks (in terms of voice and 
mobile money subscribers) and entrench their advantage through differential on-net 
and off-net transaction fees, which reinforces network effects.    
5  Tariffs are as at 17 February 2016 and were obtained from the MTN Uganda, Airtel Uganda, UTL 
and Africell Uganda websites.
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The initial regulatory light touch thus encouraged the introduction and growth 
of the new sector in Uganda. As the system grew and was adopted more broadly, 
a consequence of this regulatory approach was the dominance of the first mover 
(MTN Uganda) and second entrant (Airtel Uganda). Both these operators have 
built relatively large networks and can thus sustain revenue from their mobile money 
businesses, by encouraging existing users to remain and transact more on their 
networks, rather than to compete fiercely against each other for market share. Their 
similar pricing patterns suggest a lack of significant price competition between the 
two. In addition to the inherent network effects on smaller rivals and follower firms, 
MTN Uganda has also been found to have directly engaged in exclusionary conduct 
against EzeeMoney. The conduct with regard to USSD codes illustrates how the 
position in mobile telecommunications can be exerted to undermine rivals seeking to 
use telecommunications, to mount a competitive challenge in mobile money services. 
Continued light touch regulation may result in an entrenched concentrated market 
structure, with a dominant leader in the form of MTN Uganda and a smaller follower 
in Airtel Uganda. This has the risk of stifling innovation by other potential rivals 
offering new and improved services and undermining competition in mobile money 
as a whole. At the same time, the incentive to invest in developing new services 
depends on being able to appropriate the returns. This means that MTN Uganda, 
and to a lesser extent Airtel Uganda, are rewarded under the current structure for 
investments they make. As mobile money services mature, the concerns about 
undermining competition from other providers increase, as the innovation and 
service developments come from a diverse range of providers. These providers include 
businesses meeting the needs of different user groups, such as those providing micro-
finance to smaller farmers and aggregators looking to provider payments solutions 
(Blechman, 2016). The Ugandan authorities have already taken a step towards 
reducing barriers to smaller rivals with the removal of agent exclusivity in the Mobile 
Money Guidelines of 2013. Similarly, mandating interoperability would level the 
playing field with regard to the smaller MNOs, as long as it is accompanied by 
measures preventing excessive off-net differentials. 
Strong regulatory measures to open up access and to encourage services competition 
over the established networks include regulation of the pricing of and access to 
USSD. Some have suggested that functional separation of mobile money services 
from mobile telecommunications may also be helpful. An additional challenge that 
remains is the lack of a credible competition enforcement regime within Uganda. 
The UCC has powers to investigate and fine firms for anticompetitive behaviour, but 
they have not used these powers to date. The UCC has commissioned and conducted 
a number of studies on the key markets in the telecommunication industry, including 
a competition study of the provision of mobile platform access to USSD (Cartesian, 
2015). This assessment found that MNOs that supply access to USSD codes have 
the ability and incentive to limit competitive entry in retail markets for value added 
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services provided over USSD channels, price access to USSD excessively and provide 
poor quality service with compensation (Cartesian, 2015). A basis for UCC regulatory 
intervention has thus been set, although no regulations have been introduced as yet. 
This and the UCC’s non-intervention in the EzeeMoney case led to questions about 
how the regulator will exercise its ex ante and ex post powers. 
The light touch regulation approach used in Uganda may have benefited the growth 
of the sector initially, but it appears that change is required to enable rivals to 
challenge incumbents and reap rewards from innovation. There are still significant 
opportunities for financial inclusion in Uganda, particularly in farming communities, 
where co-operative savings can facilitate access to inputs. The dominance of the 
incumbents and exclusion of rivals appears to limit the introduction of new and 
innovative products.
By way of contrast, we comment on the situation in Tanzania, which bore similarities 
to Uganda in the initial stages of inception. Tanzania’s mobile money sector is made 
up of four players. In terms of number of subscribers, market shares as at September 
2015 were more or less evenly distributed: Vodacom (38%), Tigo (33%), Airtel 
(27%), and Zantel (2%) (Roberts, Blechman & Odhiambo, 2016). However, in terms 
of revenue estimates, as at January 2016, Vodacom had a market share of between 
53-54%, Tigo a share of about 40% and Airtel 10%. As at 2015, the service offering 
of mobile money providers in Tanzania was more robust, evolving beyond transfer 
to bill payments, mobile insurance products, merchant payment services, and mobile 
savings and credit (Roberts, Blechman & Odhiambo, 2016). 
The sector is governed by the Bank of Tanzania (BoT), using a flexible and proactive 
approach. Regulation of the sector, in the beginning, was similar to Uganda, in that 
the central bank issued letters of no objection to banks partnering with MNOs. This 
system has since been replaced, following the enactment of the National Payment 
System Act, 2015 (NPS Act). Mobile money providers must obtain two kinds of 
licences: a payment licence in order to operate a payment system and an electronic 
money approval to issue e-money. A third licence can be acquired to enable the 
issuance of payment cards (Roberts, Blechman & Odhiambo, 2016).  In addition 
to the above Act, the Payment System Licensing and Approval Regulations, 2015 
and the Electronic Money Regulations, 2015 (EMR) provide other procedures and 
conditions for the operation of these licenses. Key requirements of these regulations 
include legal separation of mobile money services from telecommunications services, 
and the prohibition of exclusivity of the providers’ agent networks. 
Tanzania’s mobile money sector also stands out because all four MMT services have 
implemented bilateral account interoperability (Roberts, Blechman & Odhiambo, 
2016). Following a process of negotiation involving the BoT, the mobile money 
providers, two of the country’s largest banks and a number of non-governmental 
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organisations (NGOs), the providers agreed on broad parameters for interoperability. 
Airtel Money and Tigo Pesa were the first to achieve account interoperability in 
August 2015, followed by EzyPesa in February 2016 and finally by Vodacom M-Pesa.
Tanzania is a success story, comparatively speaking (Roberts, Macmillan & Lloyd, 
2016). The sector experienced rapid growth in mobile money transfer, achieved 
openness of its market and yet maintains rivalry between the different operators, 
allowing for low prices and rapid innovation and the availability of a variety of 
services. A key factor of this success has been the flexible and facilitating regulatory 
framework. The sector regulation at the launch of mobile money was light touch, 
which facilitated the growth of the sector. However, subsequent regulation encouraged 
entry by removing agent exclusivity and reduced barriers to entry by facilitating 
interoperability between the various players. 
The current concern is how to facilitate entry of new and disruptive firms, including 
non-MNO mobile money providers, which could increase competition and innovation, 
and improve quality of services, in the sector. The slow pace of regulatory evolution 
in Uganda, which facilitated the development and spread of the service, may actually 
entrench MTN’s incumbency and stifle disruptive competition and innovation. Not 
only the pace, but also the intention of regulation, will need to change to encourage 
continued dynamism in the sector, as illustrated in Figure 5 below. 
Figure 5: Evolution of mobile money regulatory frameworks
Source: Sector participant interview, 22 January 2016
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5. Conclusion
Light touch regulation has proved essential for the incentivising the growth of 
mobile money, as is evident in a number of countries, including Uganda, Tanzania 
and Kenya. However, due to the nature of the industry, rapid growth can easily 
result in the creation of a dominant player. High levels of concentration and the 
existence of a dominant player may reduce the incentive to innovate and to reduce 
prices. Dominant players also have an incentive to act anti-competitively to foreclose 
entrants. The evidence suggests that this has occurred in Uganda.
 
This study found that off-net charges in Uganda are very substantially higher 
than off-net charges in neighbouring countries Kenya and Tanzania. For a transfer 
of USD15, charges in Uganda were as much as 339% more than the charges in 
Kenya and 185% more than the charges in Tanzania.  It has also highlighted anti-
competitive behaviour, such as excluding rivals, evidenced in the case between MTN 
and EzeeMoney in Uganda. 
In this context, then, regulation that is flexible, responsive and timely could encourage 
competition and lead to low prices and high levels of innovation, as Tanzania’s 
experience suggests. 
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